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Until recently, there have been two major ways of regarding the status of 
theory and method within the humanities: the view that research in this field 
has no solid scientific basis, lacking the objectivity and experimental 
repeatability of natural science; or the view that, since disciplines within the 
humanities are normally guided by methods adequate to their objects of 
analysis, just as the natural sciences are, they are no less scientific. 
According to the second alternative, we can define the word "science" 
differently: rather than taking one type of research as paradigmatic for all, 
we can emphasize the equivalence of the method/object relation in all 
disciplines. Thus it is possible to argue that the humanities are distinguished 
by reflection on the conditions of knowledge production, on the contingency 
of meaning. During the last few decades, however, or actually longer if we 
go back to the work of Thomas Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions), we have become more accustomed to the notion that even 
natural science is subject to its socio-historical context. It may therefore be 
appropriate to ask whether, conversely, this closing of the distance between 
scientific methods is mutual. Is it possible that what is arbitrary for natural 
science can actually correspond to the scientific basis of the humanities? 
To ask this question is already to imply an affirmative response. I will 
proceed from the assumption that literary research, though culminating in 
the interpretation of particular utterances, can nevertheless be placed on a 
general scientific basis, a theory of the conditions of production and 
reception of literary texts. One such theory, conceived in elementary 
semiotic, narrative, and grammatical terms, will be proposed here: a 
semiotics of narrative grammar. While semiotics is a product of modern 
society, and grammar dates from the medieval epoch, narrative has existed 
since the dawn of human culture. Let us therefore first consider the current 
status of narrative. 
It is well known that oral cultures in general depend on storytelling for 
the transmission of cultural traditions and values, even the expression of a 
worldview. In the West, it is also widely known that epic narratives like The 
Iliad and The Odyssey are repositories of knowledge important for 
sustaining a culture. Closer to our time, narrative explanations and histories 
as well as theories of evolution and development came strikingly to the fore. 
More recently, however, narrative has been called into question as 
dependent on a humanist conception of the subject (Lyotard). Especially, the 
critique of the “master narrative” as ethnocentric or totalitarian has been 
widely accepted, as has the deconstructionist critique of narratological 
binaries such as story and discourse, diachrony and synchrony. Nevertheless, 
this critique runs parallel with an opposite tendency: historiography, ethics, 
medicine, and cognitive science have recently made use, not only of 
narration but also of narrative theory as such (White, Nussbaum, Herman). 
Narrative is recognized, for example, as an essential cognitive function, or as 
a offering an alternative to propositional ethics. The project presented in this 
article forms a part of this tendency to recuperate and extend narrative in 
scientific research, while taking the new critique seriously: The reference in 
the title to squaring the circle is meant to suggest a scientific dilemma, 
problematizing the combination of diachronic and synchronic time in 
structural narratology yet proposing a new resolution.  
 Squaring the circle names a classical mathematical problem which is 
impossible to solve given the specified algebraic means. In order to find the 
dimensions of a square with the same area as a given circle, other means, 
consistent with the terms of the problem, are necessary (based on the 
recognition of π as a transcendental number). In this way squaring the circle 
may stand as a metaphor for the solution of problems of self-reference and 
spatio-temporal coherence that challenge scientific theory, and in particular 
a narrative theory like the one attempted in this essay, which addresses 
temporality in the broadest terms possible. To solve a problem of language 
couched in elementary semiotic and grammatical terms, a certain departure 
from semiotic logic is required. The problem can be formulated in two 
questions, as follows: 
 Can the diachronic and synchronic conceptions of time associated with 
narratology find a general scientific application? And how can the 
synchronic bias of structuralism be avoided in this extended application? In 
attempting to construct a general narrative grammar I will return to major 
elements of a structuralist tradition, while subjecting these to a new critique; 
by introducing change into a synchronic elementary structure of 
signification, I will – in accordance with the squaring of the circle metaphor 
– attempt to solve a problem by altering the conditions of its solution, 
cutting through its Gordian knot. I will challenge the hierarchical form of the 
structuralist binary, projecting a model of maximum variation and with no 
simple repetition of any procedure. In particular, the aim will be to reach a 
point where the inevitable − if only provisional − privileging of certain terms 
will be countered. 
In carrying out this project, here presented in preliminary hypothetical 
terms and with an emphasis on the construction of a formal model, I might 
appear to be reassuming − rather than challenging − not only a totalizing 
narrative but also a structuralist concept of universality. I would argue, 
however, that I am rather disclosing the persistence of these concepts in 
post-structuralist discourse, though to be sure universalization must now 
rigorously confine itself to elementary and indispensable categories present 
in all cultures, such as contradiction and difference, and a totalizing narrative 
must acknowledge conflicting discourses as well as the articulation of 
narrative variety. The total narrative must be of a negative kind, constructed 
indirectly through the mutual critique of opposing reductive claims in the 
existing theories that are drawn on; also, form and substance must be 
recognized as principles that found opposite but equal hierarchies. Totality is 
thus achieved by putting mechanisms of exclusion out of play. Of course, no 
theory could be universal in the sense of popular acceptance, but unargued 
disagreement − opinion − is something that scientific, methodical 
argumentation, must attempt to explain and challenge rather than 
accommodate to. 
Squaring the circle as a nominally impossible problem is also a figure for 
a literally mathematical problem and an argument that has been highly 
influential on literary interpretation following its textual application by 
Derrida: Gödel’s undecidability theorem . Concisely stated, the theorem 
holds that a number system is “unentscheidbar,” either complete and 
inconsistent or consistent and incomplete. It must either contain itself and 
thus be contradictory, or it must exclude itself and thus be consistent but 
incomplete. Gödel himself anticipated the extension of his theorem to other 
fields, referring to an epistemological dilemma, and others have elaborated 
the theorem within linguistics.  Applied to narrative theory, undecidability 
means that the inclusion of the producer of the narrative must be 
contradictory, an attempt at self-inclusion that remains a logical 
impossibility. I will argue, however, that methodical reflection on the 
conditions of narrative can resolve this contradiction. If we can adequately 
theorize the conditions that language presupposes – something outside of 
language which is yet inside language in the sense of constituting its 
necessary presupposition, then the undecidability theorem will not apply. If 
extra-linguistic reality can be theorized as structured like a language, then a 
narrative presents itself which contains the linguistic narrative and its author.  
More precisely, there is in this case no boundary, no question of 
containment: the narrative model turns back on itself.  Language then 
appears as both metaphorical and constitutive, its speakers the creatures of 
the larger narratives they devise − cosmological, evolutionary, historical − 
although strictly speaking these are not narratives but rather the conditions 
of narrative. 
Nevertheless, it might be more accurate to say that the procedure to be 
followed in this prospectus is a type of positive deconstruction, the 
construction of a model in which no terms are privileged. This is a process 
within which moments of instability and deconstruction continually occur, 
until a point of equilibrium is reached, a dynamic state of constant change in 
which constructive and destructive tendencies balance each other. Such an 
equilibrium is not directly available within cultural and historical time, 
which is why the project of a positive deconstruction must also consider 
physical and biological time – cosmology and evolution. But if literary 
theory seems to go astray when it aims to taking such a broad perspective, it 
must be said that the ultimate aim for doing so in the present context is to 
sharpen the distinctive qualities of culture and literature. My goal is to 
construct a model of literary narrative that can be inserted into a historical 
model understood in terms of its boundaries with physical and biological 
time, an insertion made possible by the use of the same type of categories in 
each instance.  Placing the literary narrative within these successive contexts 
is intended to open up the cultural significance of the literary text; the shape 
of history as presupposing the unique cognitive and linguistic competence of 
Homo sapiens; and the shape of time as based in the alteration of physical 
matter.  
To sum up this introductory section, the method of introducing change 
into an elementary structuralist model has the ultimate aim of constructing a 
model in equilibrium, with no privileged terms. This state of equality is 
associated with physical cosmology and material change, the evolution of 
life forms and consequent capacity to cognitively grasp the passage of time; 
and history which, because of its tendency toward abstract relations, 
provides conditions increasingly conducive to meta-linguistic reflection. 
Such a model is possessed of three correlated and equal pairs of terms: 
diachronic and synchronic perspectives on time; microcosm and macrocosm, 
or individual and societal perspectives on culture; and the consequent 
modeling of space and time as finite, yet without  boundaries, in which the 
constraints that dictate undecidability no longer apply, stabilizing language, 
whose ostensibly invariant structure is then only the effect of constant 
change. 
 1. Previous Research 
An earlier stage of this project was published under the title “Projecting a 
Model of Semiotic Change” (boundary 2 24:2). The present plans are to 
more rigorously construct a formal model in the adaptation of an elementary 
structure of signification – the "semiotic square" – and the employment of 
grammatical terms, expanding the model as space-time narrative while 
focusing on literary narrative syntax. The "model of semiotic change" has a 
triadic composition ultimately derived from an early work by Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things, which formulated a program for combining 
linguistics and critical theories involving society and the individual subject: 
ethnology and psychoanalysis. Foucault did not pursue this program, 
however; rather, he reversed his position on one part of the triadic project – 
psychoanalysis. It devolved on others to explore the potential of this 
strategic interdisciplinarity. In Britain, there was a significant attempt to take 
up the project, although in the place of Foucault's "ethnology" there was now 
Marxism, a significant departure from the initial conception. Linguistics was 
part of the triad in the form post-structuralist theory, essentially as included 
in the psychoanalytical theory of Jacques Lacan. Notable achievements in 
this area are works by critics such as Catherine Belsey (Critical Practice), 
John Ellis and Rosemary Coward (Language and Materialism) and the film 
journal Screen. In the United States, the Marxist theorist Fredric Jameson 
rejected the notion of signifying practice as a necessary supplement to 
Marxism, but relied heavily on psychoanalysis in The Political 
Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Act. Jameson accepted 
psychoanalysis as a materialist theory while subordinating it to the 
historicizing method of Marxism. He also used Greimas' semiotics – the 
semiotic square – but critically, as a tool for registering ideology through its 
formal closure, Influenced by these critics and the latter in particular, my 
work differs from theirs in regarding psychoanalysis neither as the missing 
subject of Marxism nor as capable of being entirely historicized. I regard 
these two theories are complementary forms of theoretical reductionism as 
well as compelling instances of materialist thought reflecting on its own 
conditions of possibility. It will also become evident in this essay that I 
regard a modified form of the semiotic square as having a positive 
application. 
Not surprisingly, the previous research on which I draw also includes 
narrative theory, well exemplified by the work of such narratologists as 
Gerald Prince, Susan Onega and José Angel Garcia Landa. Prince defines 
the basic elements of narrative in grammatical terms, while Onega and 
Garcia Landa apply sentence grammar to the activity of four subjects − real 
writer, textual writer, narrator, and character − and their respective direct 
and indirect objects. At the same time, my project is closer to the work on 
narrative by the deconstructionist critic J. Hillis Miller, who problematizes 
beginnings and endings, as I will do in seeking to model a no-boundary 
effect. 
The work of A. J. Greimas includes not only structural semantics but also 
narrative theory. I have drawn on both, though simplifying narrative syntax 
to include only the distinction between subject and object, not the other 
"actantial" functions – sender/receiver and hero/opponent. It has been the 
elementary structure of signification, the basic unit of Greimas' structural 
semantics, which has had the greatest importance for my project, although I 
claim that a synchronic structure can only exist at the most general level of a 
linguistic model, not as an elementary unit. 
 
2. Project Description  
My hypothesis is therefore that narrative theory, making use of semiotic as 
well as grammatical concepts, can resolve the dilemma of undecidability and 
that the formal model which constitutes a finite figure without a boundary 
forms an intrinsic argument about space-time, simulating the nature of time, 
as well as finding support in numerous applications. I hope to present 
sufficient evidence to support the potential validity of this claim. Two kinds 
of evidence will be presented: the first lies in the just-mentioned formal 
adequacy of the model as such, its capacity to combine the diachronic and 
synchronic as well as the double hierarchy of physical, biological, and 
cultural time, essentially modeling the recursive and looping nature of time 
that is an alternative to the impossibility of both infinity and the bounded, as  
if space were a vessel or container. The second kind of evidence presented 
will consist of the application of the model, in the concluding section of this 
article, to a literary text. The example will focus on the central trope of 
"landlessness" in Herman Melville's Moby-Dick, illustrating the prediction 
of the semiotics of narrative grammar that in the modern epoch societal and 
individual perspectives – micro- and macrocosm – are complementary. 
Landlessness is an over-determined figure inscribed in a psychosexual 
narrative as well as in history and political economy, a figure crossed by all 
four major plot modes − comedy, romance, tragedy and satire − ultimately to 
be assigned a dominant meaning as ironic romance. It is an ironic restoration 
in symbolic terms of a lost social position as well as of identity and self-
esteem.  
 2.1 The formal model 
What is a semiotic grammar then, and one that is also narrative? A simple 
answer would be that all grammar depends on linguistic signs and that 
standard grammar is well equipped to generate a concise narrative: a 
sequence of a few clauses can describe a series of causally related events. 
But what I intend is rather the use of explicit semiotic categories to represent 
an elementary narrative grammar and the extension of this grammar to a 
narrational level, a level of production that includes the implied author as 
well as narrator. 
The special type of grammar proposed for the project derives from the 
semiotic square as used by A. J. Greimas, an elementary structure of 
signification. This figure displays the conjunction and disjunction of four 
terms, or, two terms and their negations. Greimas refers to the particular 
relations that make up this figure as contradictory, implied, and contrary. I 
adapt this structure as modified by the poststructuralist critique of its static 
closure. It is an exemplary model with respect to its application of the major 
insight in modern linguistics that language is a system of differences without 
positive terms. But the semiotic square is inherently unstable, since meaning 
is shown to be relative. 
My hypothesis can be restated within this context as follows: by 
extending the relation between semantic terms to variation in types of terms, 
then variation in intrinsic and extrinsic relations of the system thus 
produced, and finally variations in material basis, it is possible to generate a 
model with three temporal dimensions in which the problematic of self-
reference and instability can be resolved. First, the semiotic square is broken 
down into three relations and moments: the contradiction, splitting, and 
difference of terms. These relations are then reproduced as grammatical 
structures (semantics, syntax, and semiotic mode); as the relation of 
grammatical systems (micro-, intermediate, and macro-grammar), or 
variation in the relation between micro- and macrocosm; and finally as the 
relation between space-times, constructed by shifting the dominant term 
from macrocosm to microcosm, a displacement that occurs as one material 
substance becomes the basis of another: physical, biological, and cultural. 
Physical reality is spatially unbounded, though with temporal limits; but 
cultural time, because it always integrates the past within present, achieves a 
synthesis of diachrony and synchrony. It is a phenomenon which we can 
experience most concretely as the momentary synchronization of plot as we 
reach the end of a narrative. 
To elaborate with only the most significant detail, the intermediate 
grammatical system consists of semantic variation in the relation 
positive/negative; the semiotic mode, of variation in the relation 
signifier/signified; and mediating between these, syntactic variation in the 
subject/object relation. As for the micro- and macro-grammars, they are 
constructed by differentiating the type of semiotic mode, where the second 
term increasingly becomes an external category as we move from micro-
grammar’s self-relation to the macro-grammatical referent that has the sign 
as its contrary. With respect to language as such, micro-grammar 
corresponds to phonology and macro-grammar corresponds to pragmatics or 
the speaking subject – in this case the production of narrative from the 
standpoint of an implied author. The reason that these systems can be called 
grammars is that they involve mediation by a subject between a relation 
intrinsic to the system and another, extrinsic relation. For example, the 
mediation between two elements of sound and their phonological encoding 
as phonemes is analogous to the mediation of syntax between the intrinsic 
relation of semantics – two signifiers – and the extrinsic relation of signifier 
and signified.  
All of these variations should be understood as constructed bi-
directionally, in a double hierarchy which ultimately places two totalizations 
in relation to each other. The notion here is that on the one hand, language 
can be derived from extra-linguistic reality as doubling and self-reference, 
while on the other hand language is constitutive of reality. Or, if we assume 
that reality is constituted, in elementary terms, by three kinds of relations 
(contradiction, displacement, and difference) and that each set of such 
relations can enter into a similar series of three relations, and further, that 
this process is repeated two more times; then reality will so to speak fold on 
itself, with the production of language as a result. It should be recalled, 
however, that the double generation of all these moments of the model 
involves the coupling of prospective and retrospective, and not any 
teleological conception. 
Let us review the kinds of temporality characteristic of each stage in this 
double hierarchy. The first series of three relations is a simple diachronic 
sequence, a linear succession of three moments. The second series involves 
levels of grammar and is more complex: on the one hand, there is a sequence 
of three moments for each level, but on the other, change at one level can be 
constrained by another level at an earlier moment of change. This means, for 
example, that three syntactic periods, though they appear successively to 
differentiate subject and object, can remain inscribed within the 
contradictory unity of signifier and signified. The third type of temporality is 
synchronic, though in a restricted sense: there is a permanent structure 
differentiating micro- and macrocosm, yet the macrocosm is the dominant 
term. Hypothetically, one can say that the basic form of time that physicists 
associate with the expanding universe corresponds to the sudden primacy of 
extrinsic relations which will persist until the energy that drives this process 
will have been exhausted, at which time there will be a reversal, a return to 
microcosmic primacy that will eventually shrink the universe to the point 
which would then be subject to another expansion. This symmetrical 
diachrony that occurs within a permanent synchronic frame is the first 
moment of the final temporal series. Together, the other two moments of 
biology and culture bring about the stabilization of this temporal 
displacement, even if only in cognitive and, from the standpoint of physical 
change, metaphorical terms. Biological time − whether we focus on 
evolution or cognition and memory − is reiterative, always beginning over 
again in a new position. Cultural time synchronizes, always reconstructing 
elapsed time from the standpoint of an ending. Culture restores the equal 
status of the microcosm, the individual, while its repetition of linear time in 
the succession of modes of production postpones this equality to the limits 
of historical development. 
The two totalizations implicit in this procedure constitute two kinds of 
synecdoche: the whole for the part and the part for the whole. The reason is 
that successive space-times, as in the repetition just mentioned, reproduce 
the conditions of the underlying space-time. Culture rests on physical and 
biological grounds, but not directly: it reproduces these as economy and 
politics, such that culture achieves relative autonomy as a space-time 
dependent on physical and biological realities, yet irreducible to them. 
Consequently, the process of model construction at the primary level, the 
installation of grammatical terms, results in a redundancy, a contradiction 
which must be resolved at another comprehensive level of the model. 
Whereas the fundamental level developed by elaborating change within the 
semiotic square installs the elementary terms, this second level effects the 
operations, carries out the syntactic functions. The combined form of these 
functions is a system of four narrative strings which redistribute the 
accumulation of an excess in one part of the system and a deficit in another 
part (more precisely, there are two narrative strings and a third which is split 
in two).The special significance of this resolution is twofold: first, it 
encloses linear change within a model that is finite yet without a boundary; 
second, it creates a narrative system which corresponds to the four mythoi or 
narrative plot modes as theorized by Northrop Frye.  
 
2.2 Literary Plot Modes 
To be more precise, this narrative system corresponds to a structural 
adaptation of Frye's model. In Anatomy of Criticism, Frye describes four 
archetypal plots in terms of the circular relation of seasons: spring, summer, 
autumn, and winter correspond to comedy, romance, tragedy, and satire, 
each with its characteristic plot and representative characters. The purpose of 
adapting these four modes to a structural model is twofold. First, the modes 
can then be placed in dynamic relation to each other, opening up readings in 
which several modes can be seen as impinging on a single text. Textual 
analysis is then not primarily classificatory, but involves reading a plot mode 
in terms of a writing strategy rather an as a given type. It should also be 
possible to read texts in terms of specific deviations from standard modes, 
such as failed closure or the deliberately open ending, and elements which 
tend to convert one mode into another. Second, reducing the plot modes to 
syntactic deep structures enables a reading of their relation to a moment of 
cultural change which is theorized by means of the same syntactic 
categories. The structural (read “post-structural” in terms of the critique of a 
synchronic bias, as stated above) or semiotic narrative syntax consists of 
four narrative strings are arranged in two correlative pairs: the conjunction 
of a positive object and the disjunction of a negative object, the disjunction 
and conjunction of ambivalent objects. The first pair opposes desire and 
aggression and involves the negation of opposing drives; the second pair 
opposes ambivalent objects and involves displacement as a method resolving 
an ambivalent drive orientation. In other words, one narrative type involves 
the acquisition of an object of desire; its contradictory involves the rejection 
of an object of aggression; and the other contradictory pair, with objects of 
both aggression and desire, must involve the release of one aspect of 
ambivalence – through grief and laughter, respectively.  
Textual analysis according to the literary model developed so far requires 
the specification of a surface structure which selectively reproduces the deep 
structure which installs the grammatical terms and the intermediate structure 
centered on four kinds of syntactic operation, or plot modes. It is a question 
of the position taken in regard to the dominant paradigm and moment of 
change which the fundamental level posits, of emphasizing a certain plot 
mode or type of resolution, as well as privileging certain categories, 
figuratively re-encoding a basic semantic register, and representing syntactic 
functions as characters. In general terms, it is a question of the production of 
narrative discourse on the basis of the selective reproduction of paradigmatic 
cultural change and the options of narrative grammar. And these general 
terms apply to the microcosm of the individual subject as well as the 
macrocosm of the societal subject. The central issue in this regard is the 
relative state of embedding of the individual in the societal. One central 
feature of history, or social evolution, is the undoing of this embedding and 
the articulation of individuality. 
 
2.3 Culture 
This cultural form of narrative grammar can be summarized by referring to 
changes in its semiotic mode, its three epochs of semiotic differentiation in 
the relation of signifier and signified. This is to say that social evolution 
moves from the naïve association of word and thing to the abstract 
association between an acoustic or visual image and a mental concept.  The 
condition of this change is material: the change from hunting and gathering 
to agricultural and finally to capitalist society. Just as the relation between 
intrinsic value and extrinsic value becomes more differentiated, so does the 
relation of signifier and signified. In this conception of three epochs or 
modes of production, I have adapted Marxist theory, and in the same spirit I 
have developed a typology of deviations from the dominant epochal mode. 
Change always depends on integration of the past; alternatively the past is 
repeated through regression, reappropriation, or reinvention. 
Similarly, I have adapted psychoanalysis for the individual instantiation 
of the model of change, although structural psychoanalysis lies closer to my 
method than does existing structural Marxism. In particular, the notion of 
three periods of psychosexual development in the work of Jacques Lacan has 
been influential. I read the sequence of symbiotic, imaginary and symbolic 
phases − the latter two generally recognized as corresponding to Freud's pre-
Oedipal and Oedipal stages − as the sequence of differentiation of the 
subject-object relation from contradictory unity to splitting and 
differentiation. Moreover, this structural translation of Marxism and 
psychoanalysis makes possible a reading of the initial embedding of 
individuality in collective relations and its subsequent independent 
articulation. This last point will be elaborated in the exemplification of the 
model which follows here. 
 
3. Method and Example: Moby-Dick 
In introducing a textual example and application of the theory, let me hasten 
to point out that I do not believe in the application of theory as the exclusive 
method of interpreting texts. Even if the theory in question were fully 
adequate, the text would always contain something unpredictable. My 
comments on Herman Melville's Moby-Dick in what follows are only 
offered as a means to another end, namely the illustration of theory. 
Interpretation as such must depend not only on theory but also on 
commentary or paraphrase of what is ultimately a unique instance of 
language. Indeed, a theory is at times valuable as the ground against which 
the particularity of the text manifests itself as sheer divergence. 
We can read the meaning of texts because we assign them a frame of 
reference or because we find in them some type of meta-language: explicit 
explanations of meaning, as in direct characterization; allusions and the use 
of familiar conventions; or anticipations of what we call theory. Moby-Dick 
is a work that excels particularly in the latter category, and it does so chiefly 
by exposing how a primal semantic level at the site of disruption which 
marks the beginning of a story is re-encoded at less transparent, symbolic 
levels where the narrative work of restoration can claim its effects. The 
semanteme or metaphor which constitutes the pivotal point of such 
associated semantic levels in Moby-Dick is "landlessness." To embrace the 
apparently limitless ocean world, as Ishmael has done in going on a whaling 
voyage as a simple sailor, is to leave the static and restrictive land world 
behind in search of adventure as well as contemplative freedom. At least this 
is the basic premise of the narrative regarded in terms of its literal physical 
events. Landlessness, however, has negative as well as positive 
connotations, and it is inscribed in other semantic fields than that of heroic 
action. 
As Ishmael himself explains, when one comes from an illustrious family 
it touches one's sense of honor to go to sea not as a paying passenger but as 
one who gets paid, and not very well at that. If we regard this first-person 
narrator as Melville's fictional persona, with all the ambiguity that this 
phrase evokes, it is not difficult to make the biographical association to the 
declining fortunes of the Melville family. In particular, this concerns the 
distinguished genealogy on his mother's side, the Gansevoorts, who enjoyed 
high status among the New York landed gentry. Even without this 
biographical reference, however, the theme of economic decline and loss of 
privileged class position is apparent. It is a case, as it were, of the text 
carrying its context within itself. We can date Moby-Dick in the sense of 
placing it within a certain historical conjuncture, not only by noting its date 
of publication in 1851, at the height of the American Romantic period, but 
by more concretely placing it at a moment when the 18th-century elite loses 
its social position in favor of the increasingly powerful middle class and the 
broadening of democratic representation.  
In terms of the semiotic model, this moment marks the onset of the 
second period of the third epoch; that is to say, the period under the third 
economic mode, capitalism, when its two major classes are increasingly 
coming into conflict. The model predicts that the equivalent change at the 
level of language and cultural representation will be the replacement of 
realist representation and empiricism with the themes of self-relation and 
reflection, with the divided self and its project of restoring a unified 
existence. Further, the embedding of individuality in a second period 
relation will produce a social Imaginary, the reproduction as social structure 
of something like a pre-Oedipal relation, though without implications for 
individual psychology. It is a question of a social structure that splits an 
earlier, relative unity of subject/object relations. And this is indeed the 
phenomenon that we can observe generally in the literature and culture of 
the Romantic period. It is the cultural dominant of Romanticism; not the 
paradigm that everyone adheres to but the reference point for virtually all 
cultural practice. 
When we go on to inquire what kind of plot mode and plot resolution 
characterize Moby-Dick, we find, not only a critical reaction to this dominant 
paradigm, but also a double determination in terms of material and libidinal 
economies. The critical reaction expresses itself as a questioning of the 
romantic reflection of self in nature. The withdrawal into the contemplation 
of nature in this novel is represented skeptically as narcissistic; the image 
that we see in all bodies of water, drawing us irresistibly, is like the image of 
Narcissus who kissed his own reflection in the pool and drowned. Ishmael 
states in agreement with Ecclesiastes that "all is vanity", and cautions us in 
Platonic terms to avoid the artificial fire, keeping to the truth of the sun. His 
story follows a path from narcissistic enchantment to disenchantment, from 
allegiance to Ahab's quest for revenge to detachment and sobering insight. 
The outcome of Ahab's quest is tragic: he has his moment of anagnorisis 
before he is pulled down into the depths by Moby Dick, while the resolution 
of Ishmael's voyage is in the mode of romance. The mother who had 
punished him severely in childhood with enforced isolation returns 
symbolically at the end to rescue him after the wreck of the Pequod. 
The two characters are the split manifestations of a single subject at the 
intermediate level of narrative syntax, and that is perhaps why the plot 
modes that govern their fates are not without traces of irony. The symbolic 
mother that rescues Ishmael is the "devious-cruising Rachel" who, in her 
search for missing members of her crew, "only found another orphan." As 
for Ahab, though his death may be seen as the tragic outcome of an attempt 
to eradicate evil, nevertheless, his vengeful ambition has a satirical aspect 
since the question of what intention might be embodied in the white whale is 
never resolved. We might conclude that the ideal of landlessness initially 
stated in the novel and figuring in both of these characters' ends does not 
entirely hold up. Or, noting that the split protagonist produces a splitting of 
plot modes, we might conclude that Melville exposes the virtual act of 
narrative resolution as illusory. Even so, however, the semiotic model of 
narrative grammar sets up an interpretation of the text as responding to a 
historical paradigm that is both material and, to use a term from Raymond 
Williams, a "structure of feeling." 
There is one major question left unanswered, however: why does 
Melville choose such a dark and skeptical resolution, regardless of plot 
mode? The most persuasive answer in the present context is that the 
articulation of a general form of individuality, since it expresses certain 
material conditions of possibility, also expresses the relation of two subject 
positions inherent in those conditions. This is to say, not only that class 
position is invoked as one constraint on meaning but also that the structure 
of feeling has its own two positional alternatives. Drawing on the narrative 
theory of Greimas, we can refer to two possible outcomes in regard to the 
narrative of restoration: euphoric repossession of the object or dysphoric 
failure. In psychoanalytic terms, these would correspond to fantasies 
associated with early ego formation. Without making any value judgment in 
favor of one position or the other, one can observe that the dysphoric 
alternative characterizes Melville's work, while the euphoric applies to such 
writers as Emerson and Whitman. Both aspects belong to the general form of 
individuality, but to explain the choice that a certain writer makes we must 
refer to his or her particular predisposition. 
I have argued earlier in this article that theories which hold to the 
primacy of social relations or of the individual, respectively, are 
complementary – they mutually presuppose each other. Psychoanalysis can 
be used to read the text symptomatically, whether focusing on the implied or 
real author, and it can be used when focusing more on the literary intention 
of a text and its cultural meaning. As I have suggested, "individuality" as a 
general social form, the transposition of embedded individual subjectivity 
onto social structure, forms an intermediate category between collective 
relations conditioned by mode of production and the particular subject. 
Thus, the psychoanalytical "imaginary" can characterize social relations in 
general, divided into euphoric and dysphoric opposites. One aspect and 
example of this cultural imaginary is the dream-like plot of Moby-Dick, the 
construction meaning in individual terms as loss and restoration. But the 
negative condition which marks the beginning of narrative can just as well 
be construed as the loss of pre-capitalist society where value has not yet 
been instrumentalized and commodified as extensively as in the emerging 
middle class culture that created those commercial conditions for the writer 
that Melville so deplored.  
In terms of this literary application, the major significance of the 
semiotics of narrative grammar I have outlined in this essay lies in its 
demonstration of how the individual can be, not only a part subordinated to 
the social whole, but also constitutive. Such a reading is made possible by 
what I have called the negative totality of the semiotic model, a totality 
which is built up, not from the standpoint of a typically unacknowledged 
metalanguage, but through the removal of the mechanisms of exclusion 
through which the model's constituent theories otherwise establish their 
autonomy and legitimacy. The complex process in which microcosm and 
macrocosm flow into each other is constant change, a continual reintegration 
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